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Abstract
Crowdfunding recently emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. We use
pledge-level data from Startnext, the biggest German platform, to gain insights on funding dynam-
ics and pledgers’ motivations. We find that the majority of projects that eventually succeed are not
on a successful track at 75% of their funding period. These late successes are boosted by information
cascades during the final 25% of the funding duration. We conclude – in contrast with earlier litera-
ture – that project success is only partially path-dependent. While early pledges do anticipate project
success, a lack of them does not necessarily mean that projects will fail. Interviews and questionnaire
responses indicate that projects’ communication efforts play a role in making severely under track
projects succeed eventually. Moreover, our dataset uniquely allows us to quantify the extent of self
funding. Self pledges account for about 10% of all initial pledges and 9% of all pledges that secure
funding. Nonetheless, the late surges at severely under track projects are mostly driven by external
funders. Furthermore, we find no evidence of subsequent herding triggered by self pledges.
JEL classifications: L26, D03, G32, 031
Keywords: crowdfunding; entrepreneurial finance; donations; pre-selling; innovation; self funding
1 Introduction
One of the biggest challenges an entrepreneur faces is to get funding for her project. Crowdfund-
ing recently emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. In contrast to traditional
financiers, such as banks, venture capital firms or angel investors, crowdfunding allows individuals
to fund entrepreneurs directly, even with extremely small amounts. Specifically, a mass of discon-
nected and independent individuals – the crowd – provides financial resources to the entrepreneur
in return for equity stakes, interest payment, the future product/service, or a non-monetary reward.
The connection between the crowd and entrepreneurs is often facilitated by an on-line platform. En-
trepreneurs present their projects on the platform, alongside other projects. Users can browse several
projects, get information and updates, and are provided with direct channels of communication with
the entrepreneurs. Hence, users take individual decisions to invest/lend/purchase/donate, but fund
as a crowd.
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Crowdfunding experienced exponential growth in the last years and has now reached a substan-
tial funding volume.1 Given this success, crowdfunding appears to have tapped a new funding chan-
nel for entrepreneurs. It can be categorized into crowd pre-selling, crowd donations, crowd equity
and crowd lending [see Hemer, 2011, Belleflamme et al., 2014]. Crowd pre-selling, essentially an ad-
vance order, and crowd donations introduce innovative interactions to the entrepreneurial finance
context and are the focus of our study. Several successful on-line platforms offer crowd pre-selling
and donations, with Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com) being the most prominent example. At such
platforms, crowdfunding entrepreneurs commonly set a funding target for their project which serves
as a threshold. The project gets funded only if the target is reached within a specified amount of time.
Individual donors pledge to support the project on the platform; their pledges turn into payments in
case the project succeeds in reaching its funding target within the allotted time frame.
Several static aspects of what motivates the crowd to pledge have been identified: feelings of
identity/community [Gerber et al., 2012], quality of communication [Beaulieu and Sarker, 2013, Mol-
lick, 2014], the entrepreneur’s social capital [Mollick, 2014], and altruism towards the entrepreneur
[Gleasure and Feller, 2016a]. The dynamics of funding behavior are less explored. Are crowdfunders
affected by the funding decisions of others and to what extent is project success path-dependent, de-
termined by very early pledges? Given that herding behavior exists, do entrepreneurs try to trigger
information cascades themselves and, finally, are they successful in doing so?
Startnext, the biggest crowdfunding platform in Germany, provided us with anonymized data of
all existing transactions from October 2010 to February 2014 consisting of 102,405 pledges over 2,713
projects. These individual-level data enable us to investigate funding dynamics and explore pledgers’
motivations.2 Moreover, the data uniquely allow us to identify whether a pledge was made by the
project creator him-/herself as Startnext does not prohibit nor sanction self-funding (in contrast to
Kickstarter or Indiegogo). This allows us to quantify the extent of self funding, identify its role in the
dynamics of project success and evaluate its impact.
With respect to funding dynamics, we find that success tends to come at a relatively late stage of
the funding duration. The majority of projects (55%) that eventually get funded are not on a successful
track when 75% of the funding duration has passed. Only 45% of eventually funded projects look like
a success story already early during the funding phase. Further analysis of the funding dynamics pro-
vides evidence for information cascades during the first 10% of the funding period. While this is in line
with early ‘success breeds success’ path-dependent patterns [van de Rijt et al., 2014, Colombo et al.,
2015], we also find information cascades during the last 25% of the funding period. These late boosts
seem responsible for the success of projects that did not look like they would get funded. Hence, a
qualification of the general notion of path dependence appears warranted: while early pledges do
anticipate project success, a lack of them does not necessarily mean that projects will fail. Qualitative
1According to the Crowdfunding Industry Report [massolution, 2016] the total funding volume of crowdfunding platforms
was $34.4 billion in 2015, up from $16.2 billion in 2014, $6.1 billion in 2013 and $2.7 billion in 2012. Crowdfunding is employed
by a variety of actors: artists who look for money for the next creative work, social projects looking for support, as well as
innovative business ventures. Hence, we use the term entrepreneur in a broad sense. It encompasses a business venture in the
traditional sense, as well as an artist or a non-profit organisation.
2To the best of our knowledge, no study investigated single transactions data from a major reward-based crowdfunding
platform [see Agrawal et al., 2014, Belleflamme et al., 2015, Gleasure and Feller, 2016b, Short et al., 2017, for recent surveys on
crowdfunding]. See Simons et al. [2017], Regner and Crosetto [2017] for studies that analyze the structure of reward levels and
Beaulieu and Sarker [2013], Gleasure and Feller [2016c] for studies that look at funding patterns over time using qualitative
methods.
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insights, from interviews with Startnext staff and questionnaire responses from projects, indicate that
projects’ communication efforts play a role in making severely under track projects succeed eventu-
ally.
With respect to self funding, our analysis shows that self pledges account for 1.6% of all pledges.
Despite this seemingly small role, we show that self pledges are substantial and important for projects’
dynamics and eventual success. The distribution of self pledges clearly identifies three main motiva-
tions: to kick-start a campaign, to revive interest in a project after a period of slack and to secure
funding. About 10% of all initial pledges are self-funded; and self pledges account for about 9% of all
pivotal pledges (the pledge making a project pass the threshold). However, we find no evidence that
self pledges trigger subsequent herding behavior, be it at the campaign’s start or later in the funding
process. We further show that some projects benefit disproportionally from self pledges: 6% of all
projects are self funded by more than a quarter of their funding target.
Finally, our study contributes to an improved understanding of crowdfunding’s emergence for
innovation. Our results indicate that the discourse between a project and its community tends to
increase the project’s chances to get funded, while Stanko and Henard [2017] show that this conver-
sation improves the quality of the future product (via ‘open search’) and the diffusion of the product
(via activating ‘earliest adopters’). Overall, it seems that the possibility of dialogue between crowd
and entrepreneur, a feature that distinguishes crowdfunding from traditional entrepreneurial finance
channels, is beneficial for innovation.
2 Related literature
2.1 Entrepreneurial finance and crowdfunding
Generally, in order to finance new or ongoing projects an entrepreneur can rely on own funds or she
can turn to external financing (by banks, venture capital firms or angel investors). The relationship be-
tween the entrepreneur and external financiers is complicated by information asymmetries regarding
the entrepreneurial project’s quality [see Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. These information asymmetries
(combined with cash constraints of potential entrepreneurs) may result in efficiency losses. Worthy
projects would go unfunded, because financial intermediaries are unable to evaluate them effectively.
As documented by, for instance, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt [2006] or Cosh et al. [2009], entrepreneurs
indeed face difficulties to secure funding from the external finance options.
Crowdfunding provides an alternative option for entrepreneurs to raise funds externally. Belle-
flamme et al. [2014] define it in the following way: “Crowdfunding involves an open call, mostly
through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in the form of donation or in ex-
change for the future product or some form of reward to support initiatives for specific purposes.”
Crowdfunding originated in the creative industries (music, movies), but it has been adopted by en-
trepreneurs from a wide range of backgrounds. Hemer [2011] distinguishes between the following
forms of crowdfunding: crowd lending, crowd equity, crowd donations, crowd pre-selling.3 The first
3Belleflamme et al. [2014] propose a similar categorization. They distinguish between equity purchase, loan, donation or
pre-ordering of the product.
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two can be regarded as the crowd analogies of the traditional financing instruments bank loan and
venture capital. Crowd donations and crowd pre-selling bring interactions known from other environ-
ments to the entrepreneurial finance context. Crowd donations are unconditional payment pledges of
funders given to the entrepreneur. While there is no obligation for the entrepreneur to give anything
in return, often some kind of reward is given to crowdfunders who donated to the project. This re-
ward can be in the form of acknowledgments, for instance, in the credits of the crowdfunded movie or
a sticker/postcard of the project. Crowd pre-selling means that the entrepreneur promises to deliver
early versions of the product/service for a specified price. Via this advance order the entrepreneur is
able to make sure that a critical production mass is reached, before she has to commit to any produc-
tion fixed costs. This advance ordering can be regarded as a test of the market potential [see, e.g. Moe
and Fader, 2002], while it simultaneously funds the project to get off the ground. Crowd pre-selling
can also be seen as a way for the entrepreneur to price discriminate between two groups: crowd-
funders who purchase the product/service in advance (possibly at a discount) and regular consumers
who purchase via the market after the project is successful [see Belleflamme et al., 2014]. Furthermore,
crowd pre-selling allows entrepreneurs to differentiate their product/service. The entrepreneur could
offer different reward levels, say, a basic version and additionally more sophisticated premium or
deluxe versions that would cost more.
Commonly, the interaction between entrepreneurs and the crowd is facilitated by a crowdfunding
platform. Belleflamme et al. [2015] distinguish between equity-, lending-, reward- and donation-
based sites. However, in practice borders between them are blurred. Donation sites sometimes also
allow for rewards to be offered to donors and reward-based sites may allow for pledges without a
reward in return. According to Hemer [2011] the threshold pledge model is the predominant model
for crowdfunding platforms that operate via crowd donations or pre-selling. This model functions in
an all-or-nothing style, that is, the platform and the entrepreneur agree on a targeted sum of money
that must be reached within a specified time span. If this threshold is not reached, there is no flow
of funds. Essentially, crowdfunders pledge to pay a specified amount, and only if the threshold is
reached their promises get implemented.
2.2 Crowdfunding and innovation
As crowdfunding is establishing itself as a new funding channel for entrepreneurs several studies
look at the impact of crowdfunding on innovation, beyond the mere fact that crowdfunding seems to
be a remedy against underfunding of worthy projects. Gleasure and Feller [2016c], Mollick [2016] and
Giudici et al. [2018] report case studies that document the relevance of community feedback. Stanko
and Henard [2017] argue that crowdfunding impacts innovation via ‘open search’: pledgers actively
contribute to the innovation process by providing feedback/ideas. They analyze technology-related
projects from Kickstarter and find that the number of a project’s pledgers and open search depth
(drawing intensely from external sources) are positively correlated with later market performance.
Their results also show that open search breadth (drawing from many external sources) leads to a
focus on radical innovation in subsequent efforts of the project. Relatedly, Chan and Parhankangas
[2017] find that – from the outset – campaigns tend to aim for incremental instead of radical innova-
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tions. Hence, the positive effect on radicalness of innovation appears to come from the interaction
between creator and crowd.
Furthermore, crowdfunding has the potential to boost the diffusion of innovations via word of
mouth [Stanko and Henard, 2017]. Reward-based crowdfunding platforms can be regarded as a mar-
ketplace for products or services that are not yet on the mainstream marketplace. Thus, pledgers of a
product or service can be viewed as the earliest possible adopters which would make them even more
valuable than traditional early adopters in terms of spreading the word about the product [Scholz,
2015].
What about the longer term impact of crowdfunded projects? The results of Stanko and Henard
[2017] show that the number of pledgers significantly impacts subsequent market performance of the
crowdfunded product, while the amount of funding raised during the campaign does not. Roma
et al. [2017] study the likelihood of successfully funded technology projects at Kickstarter to attract
subsequent funding from professional investors. Their findings show that a higher pledged amount
in the campaign is correlated with getting follow-up funding (given the presence of patents or a large
social network). Based on a survey of Kickstarter projects Mollick and Kuppuswamy [2014] report that
over 90% of successfully funded design/technology/video games projects remain ongoing ventures
one year after funding and 32% generated yearly revenues of over $100,000 a year.
Finally, Mollick and Robb [2016] argue that crowdfunding democratizes access to the capital needed
to develop and commercialize innovation. They show that in terms of geography crowdfunding
is more evenly distributed than funding via venture capital. Moreover, they illustrate how crowd-
funding facilitates access to funding for groups that are under-represented in obtaining capital from
traditional financiers (like women or minorities).
2.3 Empirical studies on crowdfunding
The literature on crowdfunding is nascent but growing fast. Gleasure and Feller [2016b], a recent mul-
tidisciplinary review of the crowdfunding literature, distinguish between different types of funding
behavior. According to them, pledgers at reward-based platforms are motivated by financial or mate-
rial benefits [besides non-monetary motivations like paying for social benefits or paying to participate, see,
e.g., Gerber et al., 2012] and signals of project/entrepreneur quality are used as guidance whether to
pledge or not. Mollick [2014], for instance, analyzes project-level data extracted from Kickstarter and
finds that project duration and a project’s target amount are negatively correlated with success. More-
over, his analysis indicates that personal networks (proxied by the number of facebook friends of the
entrepreneur) and signals of high project quality (proxied by the availability of a video that describes
the project and spelling errors in the project description) are positive determinants of project success.
Various other studies confirm that projects’ communication measures are an important success deter-
minant.4
Some studies investigate dynamic aspects of reward-based crowdfunding. In a field experiment,
4Kickstarter projects with updates have a higher success rate [Xu et al., 2014]. The use of structural as well as narrative
elements in the project presentation increases the chances of a positive outcome [Frydrych et al., 2016]. The extent of exchange
between creator and pledger in the project’s forum is positively correlated with funding success [Kromidha and Robson, 2016,
Wang et al., 2018]. The project description’s language matters for funding success [Gafni et al., 2017]. Social media usage
(Twitter, facebook) increases subsequent funding [Borst et al., 2017].
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van de Rijt et al. [2014] study the effect of a pledge to a previously unfunded project at Kickstarter. In
comparison to a control group they find significantly higher success rates of treated projects due to
cascades of positive reinforcement. Colombo et al. [2015] use three months of Kickstarter data. They
focus on the role of early pledgers in determining the success of crowdfunding campaigns and their
analysis confirms that early support is an important antecedent of project success. Also Kuppuswamy
and Bayus [2017] study Kickstarter data. In addition to project level data they collect the number of
pledgers of each project over time. They find that pledger support increases as the project approaches
its funding goal.
Dynamic aspects of funding behavior have been investigated by several studies of crowd-lending
sites. Using data from peer-to-peer loan auctions at Prosper.com, Herzenstein et al. [2011a] provide
empirical evidence of strategic herding behavior. More previous bids increase the chance a lender
bids on an auction. Zhang and Liu [2012] also analyze data from Prosper.com. They find that lenders
observe peer lending decisions and use this information to infer creditworthiness of borrowers. Their
finding of rational herding is confirmed by Yum et al. [2012]. Analyzing data of the site Popfund-
ing.com they conclude that lenders rely on their own judgment when reliable signals are available
through the market but that they seek the wisdom of the crowd when facts about creditworthiness is
limited. Generally, these studies associate a positive effect with herding behavior as it is correlated
with subsequent successful performance of the loans.
Peer effects are also found at donation sites. Burtch et al. [2013] study a crowdfunding platform
that supports journalists. The site enables prospective authors to pitch ideas for articles to the crowd
in order to get the necessary money to investigate and publish. The platform guarantees to make
all produced work publicly available, hence, the output is a public good. Their results suggest that
contributions are subject to crowding out as users contribute less when they observe others contribut-
ing more frequently. They also find that a pitch’s exposure during the funding process is positively
correlated with readership upon publication. Koning and Model [2014] conduct a field experiment
at a donations platform (www.donorschoose.org). They varied the contribution size to randomly se-
lected new projects (no, small ($5), or moderate-sized ($40)). When the first donation to a project was
moderate-sized projects fare better, when it was small they fare worse than projects with no contribu-
tion at all.
Vismara [2016] analyzes data from the UK platform Crowdcube and shows that early investors,
especially those with a public profile, attract investors in the remaining funding period. Vulkan et al.
[2016], using data from the UK platform SEEDRS, show that having a strong start is an important
campaign success determinant. Hornuf and Schwienbacher [2017] investigate data from four German
crowdinvesting platforms. They report that crowd investors react to the information provided by the
startups and also regard investments by larger, more sophisticated investors as valuable signals.
Finally, a handful of studies from computer science employ machine learning tools to forecast
project success. Given a project and its accumulated pledges at time t, these studies predict its suc-
cess probability exploiting existing data from all previous projects [Etter et al., 2013], or from similar
projects only [Etter et al., 2013, Greenberg et al., 2013]. The predictor of Etter et al. [2013] (based
on pledges as well as social features) reaches more than 85% of correct predictions after 15% of the
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project’s duration. This literature is mature and it spawned websites offering success predictions from
day one of a campaign, such as Sidekick.
To summarize, most evidence from crowdfunding sites suggests that funders take previous fund-
ing as a positive signal for their own funding decision. Moreover, data-driven approaches based on
Kickstarter manage to predict project success fairly well at a relatively early point of a project’s fund-
ing duration. It seems that path dependence is an important factor at crowdfunding and the general
understanding is that early pledges anticipate whether a project will succeed or fail. However, there
is also some evidence that is not in line with herding behavior, see the findings of crowding out in a
public good setting [Burtch et al., 2013] or the influence of goal proximity [Kuppuswamy and Bayus,
2017].
3 Data Set
Startnext, launched in October 2010, is the biggest crowdfunding platform in Germany [Crowdfunding-
Monitor, 2017]. Its funding volume surpassed e500,000 in March 2012, e1,000,000 in June 2012, and
e10,000,000 in April 2014. As of December 2017 e49,000,000 were funded. Startnext focuses on crowd
donations and pre-selling (only in 2013 it introduced crowd investing), that is, its approach is similar
to platforms like Kickstarter or Indiegogo. It employs the threshold pledge model. Hence, a project
succeeds only if its pledges surpass the targeted amount within the funding duration of the project.
If a project’s pledges amount to less than the targeted amount at the end of the funding duration, the
project is not funded and pledges are not paid by users. Project creators can choose a funding dura-
tion between 5 and 90 days. In order to enter the funding phase projects have to reach a minimum
level of fan support.5 One pledge to a project can consist of a donation and/or the commitment to
purchase the project’s product/service. A project’s page at Startnext consists of its details (funding
target, remaining time), a text description of what the project is about and a list of the reward levels in
case of pre-selling. Additionally, the project creator can post a so-called pitch video, pictures or blog
entries to provide more information about the project. The project’s current funding level as well as
the number of supporters are also accessible.
Our data set consists of all projects and all pledges made at Startnext since its launch in October
2010 until February 10th, 2014. This comprises a total of 2,713 projects: 459 that registered at Startnext
but failed to fulfill requirements to enter the funding phase and 2,254 projects that made it to the
funding phase.6 Out of those, 1,139 (51%) were successfully funded.
A description of our project-level and pledge-level variables is provided in Table 1. Overall,
slightly more than half the projects that make it to the funding phase succeed. The average dura-
tion is two months, for an average target amount of nearly six thousand euros. About 8% of projects
get recommended on Startnext’s front page. The average project is described by a half-page text, fea-
tures one video and 7 images; the project creators blog about it roughly four times during the funding
phase. The most popular project categories are movies (31.6%), music (25%), event (11.6%) and cul-
5The number of required fans depends on the target amount of the project. It ranges from 10 required fans for projects with
a target less than e500 to 100 fans for projects with a target higher than e7,500.
6We dropped a total of 13 projects (overall 75 pledges). For eleven projects the time stamps were not consistent. Moreover,
due to our focus on crowd donations and pre-selling the two investment projects in the data set were not considered.
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tural education (11.1%).
The uniqueness of our dataset stems from the pledge-level data. We can anonymously identify
projects and users in our data. This allows us to index pledges both from the user and project per-
spective. Overall, 102,405 pledges have been made by 77,201 different users. The highest number of
pledges by the same user is 109. The average number of pledges made per user is 1.32. On average,
projects got 45.47 pledges, while one project received 3,126. Generally, the majority of pledges (83%)
receive a specific service or product in return for the pledge (if the project succeeds). About 19% of
all pledges are simple donations – no reward received. This value is a lower bound, since some of
the reward levels include simple or elaborated ‘thank you’ messages from the project creators. About
2.5% of all pledges are both a donation and entail a reward.
Crucially, and differently from platforms like Kickstarter or Indiegogo, Startnext allows project
creators to pledge to their own project. Such ‘self pledges’ account for 1.6% of all pledges. A prac-
tical reason why Startnext allows this is to provide a possibility to creators to pay in funds that they
received offline, say at a funding event, for their project. Besides, Startnext argues that self funding
would take place anyway (via friends), so it is better to make it transparent by design. While the
Startnext data allow us to identify pledges made by the project creators themselves, we cannot rule
out that other pledges might be indirectly linked back to the project creator, acting through secondary
accounts or friends. In this sense, our analysis represents just a lower bound of the phenomenon of
self pledging.
4 Results
The Startnext dataset allows us to shed light on two main aspects of crowdfunding: dynamics, includ-
ing possible herding behavior, and self pledges, including their motivations, their interaction with the
dynamics and their impact. Given the breadth of the issues covered and the still fresh state of the
theoretical literature on crowdfunding, we do not set out to formally test hypotheses. Nonetheless,
this section provides a theoretical roadmap underpinning our results.
The crowdfunding literature has identified some clear stylized facts about the dynamics of a cam-
paign. Most evidence from crowdfunding platforms documents herding behavior: funding decisions
are correlated with previous funding to a project. This is in line with the literature on observational
learning [pioneered by Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992] that addresses how agents’ choices
are affected by observing the behavior of other agents. Given sequentiality of choices and uncertainty
about the valuation, the influence resulting from the information gained by observing others may lead
agents to follow other agents’ choices, even if they contradict own private information.7
As a first step in the analysis, we hence ascertain whether the Startnext dataset follows commonly
observed patterns. Thus, we check whether path-dependence exists in the early stages of funding
[building on the evidence from Etter et al., 2013, Greenberg et al., 2013, van de Rijt et al., 2014, Colombo
7 C¸elen and Kariv [2004] distinguish between information cascades and herding behavior. Individuals in a cascade neces-
sarily ignore their private signal, while individuals in a herd may ignore the private signal. Since we cannot tell the two apart
due to the lack of access to pledgers’ private signals, we use the two terms interchangeably (as it is common in the literature).
Note that herding behavior is not necessarily rational. In fact, people may disregard information redundancies in their decision
making leading to excessive, and potentially harmful, imitation [Eyster and Rabin, 2014].
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et al., 2015].
However, the conditions for observational learning are not only in place early on but at any point
of the funding duration. Thus, there is no reason why potential pledgers should not continuously be
looking for cues of project quality. They may take others’ choices to pledge to a project as a sufficiently
positive quality signal in order to pledge themselves, be it early or late. Hence, we check to what extent
path dependence rules projects’ success chances also at later points of the funding duration.
In order to shed more light on the drivers of herding behavior, independently of how much fund-
ing time has passed, we perform two distinct yet complementary analyses. First, we conduct a quan-
titative analysis of self pledges. Project creators may be aware of the potential for herding, and hence
use self pledges strategically trying to initiate a cascade, to kick-start/revive their campaign. Besides,
they may pledge themselves in order to reach the funding target, thus guaranteeing the funding of
their project, especially if the funding period approaches its end. Second, we obtain qualitative data
from interviews with Startnext staff and a survey among selected projects. The survey focuses on a
subset of projects with the most informative dynamics and aims to collect stylized facts about what
might have triggered late funding boosts.
Finally, we jointly analyze herding behavior and self funding exploiting the pledge level of our
data. We test econometrically in which phases of the funding duration herding actually occurs and to
what extent there is an interaction between herding and self pledges.
4.1 Funding dynamics
For our analysis of funding dynamics we normalize the funding duration of projects as well as their
target amount. All projects start at project time 0 and end at 1 which means that independently of the
actual funding duration (which could be between 5 and 90 days) a pledge given at the, say, halfway
mark of the project is given at 0.5 of the normalized project duration. Likewise, for each pledge to a
project we compute the ratio of cumulative pledges to a project’s target amount, the funding ratio. This
indicator tells us for each point in time how far along the road to success (funding ratio ≥ 1) a project
is, in a way that is comparable across projects.
At the aggregate level, the timing of pledges is characterized by a bimodal distribution. A quarter
of all pledges are made within the first 10% of the normalized project duration, and a further spike
is observed at the end of the project life. This aggregate pattern of pledges over time is in line with
behavior at Kickstarter as reported by Kuppuswamy and Bayus [2015].
However, the bimodal distribution hides a large individual heterogeneity of dynamic funding
patterns. Projects follow logarithmic, linear (with varying slopes), or exponential patterns. That is,
success can be achieved early on, little by little, or at the very last minute. In order to shed some light
on the funding dynamics, we categorize projects according to how they fare, at any given moment,
with respect to the average successful project.8 We characterize projects as being on track if they follow
– within a 5% band – the dynamic path of the average successful projects, and over or under track if
they are respectively out- or under-performing.
8The performance with respect to the average successful projects has already been used to predict project success [Etter et al.,
2013, Greenberg et al., 2013].
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Figure 1: Share of successful projects over, on or under track across project time
The average successful project starts fast, has a weak period lasting until half of the project dura-
tion in which pledges reduce their growth, and spikes in the end to reach beyond its funding target.
We define a project as on track at time t if its funding ratio lies within a 5% band around the average
project’s funding ratio at time t.9 Figure 1 shows the share of those projects that eventually end up
succeeding that are under, on and over track across normalized project time.
If projects were similar to the average project, then being below the average path at, say, three
quarters of project life should be a clear predictor of failure. Moreover, if project dynamics were
path-dependent, i.e. if “success breeds success” [van de Rijt et al., 2014], the path followed over
three quarters of project life should be long enough to clearly spell failure for under track projects.
Our data largely prove otherwise. A large share of eventually successful projects are not on track
for most of their duration: many under-track projects are late bloomers.10 This is especially striking
since the average project itself is a late bloomer. At 75% of project life more than one project in two
underperforms the average, yet eventually jumps upwards to reach success in the very end. As Figure
1 shows, only after approximately 90% of project time the majority of successful projects are actually
on/over track to succeed.
To allow for a finer analysis we split the under track category into three different subcategories:
slightly under track projects are up to 10 percentage points away from the track; under track projects, 10
to 30 percentage points away; and severely under track projects, more than 30 points away. Moreover,
we label as rockets the 94 projects that had reached success before half of project time, and we deem as
failed the 674 projects that never make it off the ground, never reaching more than 10% of their funding
target over project time. Projects’ performance with respect to this finer categorization is summarized
in Table 2.
The data support path-dependence only partially: while being on or over track overwhelmingly
leads to success, being under track is not an effective predictor of project failure. That is, success
9In order not to penalize projects in the very end, we define our track as the minimum of the track of the average successful
project and 1, thus effectively considering success as success and not deeming ’under track’ a project that is at, say, 105% of its
target in the last days but shy of the average 117%.
10The converse is not true, though: most failed projects fail from the very beginning, so that more than 95% of projects that
eventually fail are under track after 5% of project time.
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Figure 2: Pledges over project time, classified according to the data-driven track at 75% of project time
12
Failure Success Total % Success % Funded
Failed 674 – 674 0% 3.5%∗
Severely under track (> 30%) 387 248 635 39.1% 106%
Under track (10− 30%) 38 245 283 86.6% 111%
Slightly under track (< 10%) 9 130 139 93.5% 109%
On track 5 46 51 90.2% 107%
Over track 2 376 378 99.5% 117%
Rocket – 94 94 100% 177%
Total 1,115 1,139 2,254 50.5% 65.4%∗
∗ not conditional on success
Table 2: Performance with respect to data-driven track at 75% of project time.
breeds success alright, but (initial) failure can lead to success, too. Only 0.5% (2 out of 378) of projects
that outperform the average successful project at 75% of project time end up being failures, but an
impressive 93.5% (130 out of 139) of slightly under track projects, 86.6% of under track and 39% of
severely under track projects eventually succeed. Since the average successful project reached a fund-
ing ratio of 69.5% by three quarters of project time, this means that projects that reached as low as
39.5% of their funding ratio still have a 9 in 10 chance of succeeding, and that projects below that
threshold (but above 10% funding) still have 4 chances in 10. The last column of Table 2 lists the aver-
age funding percentage (conditional on reaching the funding target). Tests of equality in distribution
show that severely under track projects are different from the other categories (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
tests, p < 0.01), while the distributions of slightly under track, under and on track projects are not
significantly different from each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests, p > 0.12). It seems that success-
ful severely under track projects collect less funds than successful other categories. Note, however,
that the amount of funding raised during a campaign does not seem to have an effect on subsequent
market performance of the crowdfunded product [Stanko and Henard, 2017].
To shed further light on the dynamics of individual projects, Figure 2 plots all pledges over time,
according to the final outcome of the project (failure or success) and the on-track status at 75% of
project time. The red line is the path followed by the average successful project, and the grey area
around it is the on-track band.
Figure 2 illustrates the large heterogeneity of dynamic paths across projects. Failed and successful
under track projects share a similar slow start, but eventually successful ones experience a dramatic
boost after 75% of project time, resulting for some projects in ‘exponential’ trajectories. On track
projects show the expected inverse-S shape of the average successful projects; the few failed on/over
track projects lose momentum towards the end of project life and do not get a boost in the last quarter.
Among over track projects, some rockets reach their target early – most of them in the first quarter
of project life – resulting in ‘logarithmic’ trajectories. It is worth noting that all eventually successful
projects beside rockets share a surge in pledges in the last quarter of project life.
These dynamic patterns are strongly at odds with a generalized path-dependence interpretation
of the data. Out of all successful projects, 33% were up to 30% off the average project and 22% were
even more under track at three-quarters of project time. Figure 3 allows us to better understand the
nature of the late boom. It reports, for each dynamic category and for each of ten time intervals, the
mean amount of each pledge received and the average number of pledges per project.
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Figure 3
The overall means, over all time and all on-track categories, are 60.87 euro per pledge and 45.47
pledges per project (when translated into the 10 intervals, this yields roughly 4.5 pledges per project
per interval). The different on-track categories show very different patterns. More specifically, in the
last three intervals we see that severely under track projects do attract more pledgers than they did
up to then, but that their number remains low compared to all other categories except failed projects;
on the other hand, the amount pledged increases more than threefold in the last quarter of project life,
from 53 to 177 euros per pledge, the highest amount recorded. These dynamics are peculiar to severely
under track projects, and not shared by other less under track projects that keep the average amount
roughly unchanged but increase two to fourfold the number of pledgers. These results suggest that
severely under track projects fundamentally change their audience in the last quarter of their life, and
that their observed late boom is due to generous last-minute donors rather than to having reached a
wider audience.
Since Startnext allows self pledges – i.e., allows the project creator to directly pledge money to
her own project – this result might be due to either the presence of external angel investors that pick
among the lagging projects the ones they want to support, or that project creators pledge themselves
over the threshold. We answer this question in the next section.
4.2 Self pledges
Self pledges account for 1.6% of all pledges. About one third of all project creators fund their own
project, half of them self pledge only once. The distribution of self pledges over time is bimodal, con-
centrated at the beginning and end of a campaign. Descriptive statistics of self pledges are provided
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of self pledges over time and by pledge type
in Table 3, top. Generally, self pledges are in terms of amounts pledged about four times as big as
common pledges. Self pledges tend to be made in a moment of inactivity: the mean time lag from the
previous pledge is higher for self pledges than for common ones.
pledge type
first ‘in-between’ pivotal after target met total
N self pledges 203 1,249 99 113 1,664common pledges 2,051 80,813 1,040 16,846 100,750
Mean e self pledges 32.23 208.56 474.77 108.48 196.06common pledges 47.41 57 411.02 47.65 58.77
Mean time lag self pledges – .03 .028 .0166 .029common pledges – .018 .026 .008 .016
By dynamic category
Failed projects Self pledge 84 67 – – 151Self pledge share 12.46% 1.75% – – 3.36%
Severely under track Self pledge 51 368 33 11 463Self pledge share 8.03% 2.47% 13.31% 1.8% 2.83%
Under track Self pledge 23 349 24 14 410Self pledge share 8.13% 2.37% 9.8% 0.77% 2.40%
Slightly under track
Self pledge 16 168 15 13 212
Self pledge share 11.51% 1.85% 11.54% 1.53% 2.08%
On track
Self pledge 2 55 7 14 78
Self pledge share 3.92% 1.52% 15.22% 4.33% 0.93%
Over track
Self pledge 20 208 18 44 290
Self pledge share 5.29% 0.73% 4.79% 0.71% 0.82%
Rocket
Self pledge 7 31 2 20 60
Self pledge share 7.45% 0.43% 2.13% 0.28% 0.41%
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of self pledges by type and dynamic category
Based on the time of their occurrence during the funding process, we distinguish four types of
pledges. First, self pledges might be the first pledge ever to be received by a project. Then, self pledges
might be made during the campaign, ‘in-between’. Sometimes it is a self pledge that actually pushed
the project above the funding threshold: we call these self pledges pivotal. Finally, self pledges can
arrive after the funding target has been reached. Figure 4 plots self pledges over time and funding
ratio and by pledge type, and Table 3, bottom, provides descriptive statistics.
About 10% of all project creators start the funding of their campaign themselves. The average
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size of these self pledges is significantly smaller than the average size of first pledges by other users
(ranksum test, p < 0.01). Out of all self pledges, 12.5% are used to start off funding to a project. ‘In-
between’ self pledges account for the majority of all self funding. The average ‘in-between’ self pledge
is significantly bigger and its time lag to the previous pledge is significantly longer than for their com-
mon counterparts (ranksum tests, p < 0.01). Its size tends to be more than 1% of the project’s funding
target which could be an indication that project creators intend to visibly increase their project’s fund-
ing on the web site – which only shows integer changes. For 99 projects, a self pledge secured the
project’s funding. Such pivotal self pledges are, on average, bigger in comparison to the size of com-
mon pledges and also compared to other self pledge types (ranksum tests, p < 0.01). Finally, there are
113 self pledges after the funding target has been reached. Project creators may have wanted to push
their project across the funding target but before they did a pivotal pledge to their project was made by
someone else. Another explanation could be project funding that has been collected offline (at events,
from supporters unwilling/unable to register online, say the grandma of the creator). These funds
might be paid in when they accrue or, more likely, all lumped together towards the end of funding.
The two projects that surpassed their funding target very early on via a self pledge are most likely
examples for such (very successful) offline collections.
According to these patterns of use self funding is motivated by an indirect and a direct effect on
overall funding. First, project creators may anticipate that users regard received pledges as a quality
signal. Thus, they may try to initiate a cascade of pledges with their own pledge. Second, project
creators may want to make sure that they get the funding for their project by pledging the amount
that is still missing from reaching the target.
We first look at the direct effect of self funding: what is the role of self pledges, especially pivotal
ones, in the late surges documented in figure 3? Generally, self pledges are more frequent in cate-
gories that seem furthest away from success: in fact, the proportion of self pledges is monotonically
decreasing across project categories (table 3, bottom, last column). By and large this pattern holds for
pivotal self pledges: while they occur in under, on and over track projects alike, they are significantly
more frequent among severely under track projects (13.31%) than among the rest (2.8%, chi square
test, p < 0.01)
Excluding self pledges, the mean amount pledged to severely under track projects in interval 10
drops from 177 to 166, with 4.42 pledges per project, down from 4.65. This is still significantly higher
than earlier intervals of other project types. The decreases for (slightly) under track projects and in
intervals 8 and 9 are similar in size. Thus, the large majority of late funding to severely under track
projects comes from external sources. It seems that there are indeed generous donors, angels in the
crowd, who substantially support projects that look like they will fail.
However, some projects receive substantial self funding. While overall 693 project creators self
pledged for, on average, 12.3% of their funding target, the 99 projects with a pivotal self pledge on
average self-funded 29.8% of their target. About two thirds (68) already self pledged before making
the pivotal one themselves (on average, 3.21 times). About half of them funded more than a quarter
of their own project.11 Overall, the direct effect of self funding is minor in comparison to the late-stage
11Among self funded projects who did not make the pivotal pledge only 15% (88 projects) pledged more than a quarter, 86 of
them reached their target.
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efforts of the crowd. Nevertheless, it is evident that around 6% of project creators helped themselves
substantially to get their project funded. Given the nature of our dataset we are limited to identifying
the extent of pivotal self pledging but we cannot evaluate its effect on the chances of a project to
deliver what it promised. Thus, whether the influence of pivotal self pledges biases funding remains
to be answered.
What our data permits is a limited analysis of project quality via a simple proxy: subsequent
projects by the same project creator. It seems safe to assume that if a project failed to deliver its goods
or services, then a subsequent project by the same person would have difficulties to attract funding.
In our data there are 2,110 first time projects (642 self funded, 1,468 not) and 125 second projects. If the
first project received at least one self pledge (52 times), the success rate of the second project is 71%.
If it did not (73), it is 56%. Acknowledging the sample being limited, the proxy being fuzzy and the
possibility that self pledgers may simply care more about their projects, there does not seem to be a
negative effect of self funding on the likelihood to start another project nor on its success chances.
Table 4: Success determinants in the starting and funding phase
I: starting phase II: funding phase
a: all b: severely under track c: under track or closer
coeff. st.error coeff. st.error coeff. st.error coeff. st.error
Target amount (in 1000e) -.0005 .0002 ** -.0231 .0042 *** -.0337 .0085 *** -.0012 .0004 ***
Funding duration – – -.0035 .0005 *** -.00001 .0008 -.0008 .0003
Word count (in 100) .0056 .0021 *** .0064 .0045 .0057 .0065 -.0016 .0008 *
Video count .0526 .0095 *** .0284 .0094 *** .0344 .0119 *** .0024 .0022
Image count .0193 .0023 *** .0031 .0031 -.0002 .0012 .001 .0008
Blog entries – – .0312 .0035 *** .0181 .0057 *** .0033 .0012 ***
Recommended – – .7619 .0866 *** .2976 .1379 ** .0789 .0254 ***
Self-started – – -.1372 .0429 *** -.0628 .0852 -.0019 -.0189
Number of in-between self pledges – – .1482 .0207 *** – – – –
Number of self pledges after 75% – – – – .4605 .0689 *** .024 .0132 *
Years since launch of Startnext -.0131 .0046 *** .1485 .0215 *** .1071 .0366 *** -.0146 .0121
Category dummies yes yes yes yes
N 2,713 2,254 635 945
Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors; significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%
The specification in IIb includes severely under track projects; the one in IIc under track, slightly under track, on track, over track and rockets.
What is the indirect impact of self funding at the project level? We proceed to test the effect of
self pledges on project success, controlling for other potential determinants. Table 4 column I presents
the results of a probit regression on the first step – getting enough fans. Reaching the funding phase
is correlated with lower target amounts, a higher word count and the presence of additional videos
and images. Table 4 column IIa reports results of a probit on the second step – reaching the target
amount. Our results by and large replicate established findings based on Kickstarter [Mollick, 2014],
from several Italian crowdfunding sites [Giudici et al., 2013] and technology projects from four crowd-
funding platforms [Cordova et al., 2015]: smaller, shorter projects have higher success rates; higher
efforts on communication as proxied by web site quantifiers pay off.12 Moreover (not shown), music
and movie projects have higher success rates, while literature, invention and technology projects have
lower ones.13
In addition, our dummies for self funded projects show that an initial self pledge is negatively
12See Kaartemo [2017] and Buttice` et al. [2018] for reviews of the literature on the success determinants of crowdfunding
projects.
13See the appendix for summary statistics by categories and a correlation matrix as well as variance inflation factors (all
regressors are below the conventional cutoff of 10).
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correlated with project success. In contrast, the number of in-between self pledges is positively cor-
related with eventual funding. A possible explanation could be that self-started projects tend to be
of low quality. Actual quality of the project prevails as potential pledgers tend to get their evalua-
tion right, despite the intervention of the project creator. Hence, a self pledge to start the campaign’s
funding seems to be rather an indication of desperation than a useful tool to get the crowd going.
4.3 Potential drivers of late funding boosts
The fact that communication efforts (blog posts, videos) are determinants of project success might
be indirectly linked with the late booms of severely under track projects, whose creators might have
made an extra effort at reaching a larger audience. To check this line of argument we ran two addi-
tional regression specifications, restricted to severely under track projects (column IIb of Table 4) and
to under track or closer (column IIc of Table 4). Results confirm that proxies for communication ef-
forts (video count and blog updates) are not only correlated with project success for the entire dataset
but also for the subset of severely under track projects; their effect is stronger than for projects closer
to success. In order to capture the effect of late self pledges we have replaced the in-between self
pledge variable with the number of self pledges after the 75% mark. For severely under track projects,
the number of self pledges during the last quarter of funding is significant at the 5%-level, while for
projects closer to their target at the 75% mark the estimated effect is positive but not significant. In
terms of project categories, among severely under track projects music and movie projects have higher
and technology projects lower success rates. Among projects closer to the target, only art projects are
correlated with funding success (positively).
Our analysis so far suggests that communication activities and self funding play a role in making
severely under track projects succeed eventually. However, our data are mute on the timing of the
communication efforts. While we find a correlation between the extent of videos/blog updates and
the success of severely under track projects, these activities may have taken place early on. Due to this
lack of a time dimension of the communication data we decided to ask the parties closely involved in
the funding processes about their experiences. We followed two roads: interviews with Startnext staff
and a questionnaire allowing us to get insights directly from project creators.
First, we discussed the potential reasons behind the late boosts directly with Startnext. They gen-
erally advise project creators to prepare communication measures before the start of the funding in
order to share news about the campaign (among existing contacts, in social networks, etc.) right when
the funding duration starts. However, their experience is that not all projects are actively and consis-
tently working the communication channels early on. Startnext suspects that late boosts take place
when such projects start to share and communicate about their campaign.
Second, we conducted a questionnaire among project creators designed to identify their general
approach to present their project and communicate about it, and the possible changes of strategy
along the course of the funding campaign. We focused on severely under track projects with a fund-
ing target of more than e5000 and a minimum of 50 pledges. This resulted in 40 projects, 15 failed, 25
succeeded to get funded.14 We eyeballed their scatter plots in order to filter out unsuitable patterns
14In order to improve the sample balance with respect to failures/successes we softened the pledge minimum to 35 for the
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(very low pledge activity after 50%, high extent of self pledges) which reduced the sample by 6. Valid
email addresses could not be found for 9 projects. Thus, we sent out in total 25 questionnaires, 15
to successful and 10 to failed projects. We contacted project creators by email or web form with our
invitation text linking to an online platform. We pledged to reward complete responses to the ques-
tionnaire with a e20 gift voucher and received responses from 8 successful and 4 failed projects. See
appendix B for a translation of the original German questionnaire.
A complete summary of the questionnaire replies, grouped according to key project metrics (target
amount, dynamic pattern before the 75% mark of the funding duration) and contrasting failed vs.
successful projects within each group is given in Table 8, Appendix C. This allows us to compare the
activities of projects that are relatively similar in terms of funding target and development, knowing
that some managed to reach their target, while their ‘twins’ did not. Plots of funding over project time
are also shown in Appendix C (one success and one failure of each group).
All successful projects stressed that continuous communication effort was needed over the whole
campaign. Towards the end of the campaign, six out of eight projects intensified social media cam-
paigns that were present from the start. Five out of eight started/intensified communication to their
direct network by personally contacting friends, family and acquaintances, or mobilizing the company
newsletter contacts. Two projects started/intensified communication on the Startnext website, initiat-
ing a video series and a blog, actively replying to all comments on the platform. Two projects added
new reward levels in mid-campaign, one of them following a forum comment wondering about such a
reward level. The role of self pledges and angel investors is also present in questionnaire replies. One
project, upon seeing no more pledges coming in for some time, directly asked family and friends for
pledges, ”to get things going again”. Another project got to know after the campaign that a single user
– unknown to the project creators up to that point – pledged around 25% of all funds in three distinct
pledges just before the campaign’s end (after having followed closely the performance of the project
and to ensure success). The presentation of the project as well as the active and open communication
was given as reasons by the user. A third project personally contacted friends and acquaintances to-
wards the end of the campaign which led to several substantial pledges pushing the funding across
the threshold. A fourth project self pledged six times between 80% of project time and right after it
reached its target. The pledge boost driving the project to success seems to have started already before
the first self pledge was made.
Failed projects in general report a carefully planned set of activities at the beginning. Three out of
four projects, however, do not followed up nor intensified as the campaign proceeded. Project 2226
recounts that they participated at public events showing their prototype when the campaign started.
They did not report further activities in the remaining campaign. They made eight self pledges be-
tween 60% and 95% of project time, however, without any apparent influence on the subsequent fre-
quency of pledges. Project 386 answers that they contacted friends, acquaintances and existing clients
about the project when the campaign started. They also posted in social media (Facebook, Twitter).
They did not continue, let alone intensify, their communication efforts in the remainder of the cam-
paign. They also told us they realized not being persistent with communicating about the project was
a mistake. A follow-up project later that year succeeded. Project 1603 reports that they contacted jour-
failures.
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nalists at the beginning of the campaign. Around the midpoint they started to post on Facebook and
towards the end of the campaign they sent out emails to friends/acquaintances. Project 2248 recounts
that they distributed a newsletter and a mailing to the press when the campaign started. Afterwards,
they updated their Facebook and project web site.
Overall, the impression from the responses of projects that eventually succeeded is that they inten-
sified their communication efforts on social media channels and/or managed to activate substantial
support from their friends/family (or even big donors previously unknown to them). In contrast,
most projects that eventually failed tell us that they did not step up communication efforts towards
the end of the campaign.
4.4 Econometric analysis of herding and self pledges
Our analysis so far focused on descriptives and identified general patterns in the data. We now turn to
an econometric model to shed more light on the relationships behind the funding dynamics. In order
to analyze the effect of social influence we set up a panel consisting of all projects that made it to the
funding phase. While we have the time stamp of each pledge to each project, a panel using an exact
time variable would mostly contain zeroes (since at the very time stamp of one project other projects
most likely did not receive pledges). Hence, we have to trade off time precision and tractability of the
regression analysis. We decided to collapse project time into 100 units that we call ticks. Therefore, all
pledges a project collects within one tick are summed up. Since funding targets differ across projects
we normalize the pledged amount received. Thus, the funding ratio y is the cumulative pledged
amount to a project at the end of one tick divided by the project’s target amount. The increase of the
funding ratio during one tick, ∆y, is our dependent variable.
From our descriptive analysis we already know that pledges are distributed unevenly over project
time. We observe a higher volume of pledges in the beginning and towards the end. We control for
this by using dummies dividing project time in ten equally-long intervals. Thus, interval 1 represents
the first 10% of a project’s funding duration and interval 10 the last 10%. In the regressions, interval
6 serves as the baseline. In order to proxy the effect of social influence we use the increase of the
funding ratio during the previous tick as our main explanatory variable. The idea of this approach is
to capture funding increases triggered by users getting information about recent funding choices of
others, independently of the current funding ratio of the project. We discuss an alternative, using the
previous tick’s funding ratio, later on. Since our previous analysis revealed substantial heterogeneity
of funding dynamics, we interact our interval dummies with the lag of the funding ratio’s increase.
Thus, we test whether herding takes place in specific intervals of the funding period.
We use project fixed effects to take unobserved heterogeneity at the project level into account.15 In
∆yit = α+ β1 · ∆yi,t−1 + β2 · It + β3 · ∆yi,t−1 · It + β4 · Kit + vi + eit
the dependent variable ∆yit is the increase of project i’s funding ratio in tick t, It is a vector of
dummy variables controlling for the time interval, Kit is a vector of control variables, the project-
specific error term is vi, the residual is eit and t = 2, ..., 100. The relatively high number of ticks has the
15Due to the normalization and collapsing of the data we cannot control for the day of week, month or year.
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advantage that it evades ‘dynamic panel bias’ [Nickell, 1981] which complicates the analysis of ‘small
T, large N’ panels featuring a lag dependent variable [Roodman, 2006].
Table 5 shows the regression results in column 1. We observe positive level effects of early intervals
(1 to 3) and late ones (7 to 10). The main effect of ∆yit−1, the lag of the increase of the funding ratio,
is not significant. The interaction term of the first interval and ∆yit−1 is positive and significant at the
1%-level. Moreover, the interaction terms between ∆yit−1 and the seventh, eighth and last interval are
also positive (significant at the 5%-level). It seems that there is no general herding. It is rather limited
to the start of the funding period and towards its end. The specification in column 2 tests for the effect
of self pledges. We include the number of a project’s self pledges during the previous tick as a main
term as well as interacted with the intervals. Results indicate no general effect of the extent of self
funding.
These results generally establish an effect of social influence. An increase of the funding ratio in
the previous tick is estimated to have an effect of up to 11% (during interval 1) on the increase in the
current tick. We now dig a bit deeper looking at specific project types. Column 3 of table 5 shows
a separate regression for severely under track projects; column 4 considers all other projects. The
categorization uses the data-driven approach described earlier at 75% of project time.16
The distribution of pledges over project time exhibits the familiar pattern for both severely under
track projects and the rest. We observe high pledged amounts in the beginning/end, while in the
middle of the funding duration the volumes tend to be lower. For both categories, positive cascades
take place in interval 1 (significant at the 1%-level). They seem to be more pronounced for projects not
severely under track (coefficient of 0.11) than for severely under track projects (0.073). In late intervals
(8 to 10), the coefficients of severely under track projects are significant (at the 5/1/1%-levels), while
the coefficients of the remaining projects are marginally significant (interval 7) at best. It seems that
towards the end of the funding duration herding takes place only among severely under track projects.
The estimates for the effect of a funding ratio increase in the previous tick on the funding ratio increase
in the current tick range from 6.5% to 7.4%.
Moreover, we find a positive correlation between the funding increase and the number of self
pledges in the previous tick for severely under track projects in the seventh interval. However, taking
the main effect of the number of self pledges into account, the statistical significance is only marginal
(p = 0.08). While we identified in-between self pledges as a positive determinant of project success,
our data do not support that self pledges affect subsequent funding, that is, trigger herding behavior.
Changing/extending the sub-sample to under track projects does not lead to different results.
4.5 Robustness checks
In the following we discuss the robustness of our results. We first test for multicollinearity in our
regression model. The variance inflation factor of the lagged funding ratio increase is above the con-
ventional cutoff of 10, while all others are below. In order to test whether this affects our results, we
drop the main term of the lagged funding ratio increase. The results of the adjusted regression are
in column 5 of table 5. The effect of momentum appears slightly stronger early on (higher interac-
16Alternative specifications with smaller values for project time like 50%, 60% or 70% deliver qualitatively similar results as
the ones reported.
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tion coefficient in interval 1 and a marginally significant interaction coefficient in interval 2) and as
well towards the end of the funding duration (1%-levels of significance in intervals 7, 8 and 10). Our
analysis uses the funding ratio increase in the previous tick to measure the effect of social influence
on project funding. Also the actual value of the funding ratio appears to be a reasonable measure as
a project’s current funding level and its funding target are shown on its page. This approach would
focus on the cumulative funding amount of a project which could be regarded as an expression of
previous pledgers’ collective evaluations of the project. Column 6 of table 5 presents results for the
corresponding regression. Using the funding ratio as regressor instead of the funding ratio increase
delivers very similar results. The effect of momentum seems stronger towards the end of the funding
duration (interaction coefficients in intervals 7 to 10 significant at least at the 5%-level). In interval 1
the interaction coefficient is highly significant but there is no level effect.
4.6 Discussion of results
Our regression results provide two insights about the dynamics of reward-based crowdfunding. In-
formation cascades do not only take place at the start of campaigns but also later, especially during
the last quarter of funding. Thus, the notion of path dependence holds only partially: a strong start
is almost a guarantee for success, yet a slow start does not rule out that a project gets funded even-
tually. Moreover, we find only partial evidence in line with a goal proximity effect as proposed by
Kuppuswamy and Bayus [2017]. While our data support a correlation between added pledgers and a
project’s proximity to its funding goal (their specification), we do not find an effect of goal proximity
using the increase of funding as dependent variable and its lag (see column 7, table 5) or the lag of cu-
mulative funding as an explanatory variable. It seems that more pledges are made the closer a project
gets to its funding target, but the total amount pledged to a project does not increase.
We conclude the results section with a discussion of the limitations of our approach. Our quan-
titative and qualitative analysis indicates that communication efforts of severely under track projects
lead to increases of the pledged amount. Communication activities may have attracted additional
pledges which, in turn, triggered an information cascade. The behavioral pattern we find in our data
is consistent with such observational learning. Alternatively, all new pledges may have been caused
directly by communication. This seems unlikely given the short amount of time that passes between
sending and receiving information in social media networks. The ‘half-life’ of a tweet is 24 minutes
and the one for a Facebook post is 90 minutes according to Wiselytics [2014]. Thus, it seems probable
that pledges directly resulting from a post/Tweet would tend to be made on the same day.
However, we cannot rule out that instead of observational learning another social influence chan-
nel, namely, word of mouth, is to be attributed for the increase of pledges following a communication
trigger. While observational learning means that a cascade develops within the crowdfunding plat-
form (due to observing others’ actions), word of mouth implies that information about the project
spreads within another platform, a social media network (due to reading others’ endorsements of the
project). Some exposed to the endorsements may turn into pledgers. Thus, both underlying processes
would diffuse in similar fashion and both would result in the behavioral pattern we observe. See
Ellison and Fudenberg [1995] for a theoretical approach to model social learning via word of mouth.
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For the scope of our study, it is only of interest whether social learning occurs, not on which plat-
form and via which channel (observations and/or opinions/endorsements). Of course, the question
where/how social learning takes place in crowdfunding environments remains as a topic for future
research. See Chen et al. [2011] for an empirical analysis that disentangles between the two processes
in the context of product purchases. See Kaminski et al. [2018] for a study on the interplay between
two forms of electronic word of mouth, online forum interactions (on Kickstarter) and social media
activity (on Facebook).
5 Conclusion
Crowdfunding experienced exponential growth over the last years and can be regarded as an alter-
native to traditional financiers of entrepreneurs, like banks, venture capital or angel investors. We
received individual-level data from Startnext, the biggest crowdfunding platform in Germany. This
dataset allows us to investigate the dynamics of pledges, explore the motivations of pledgers and
assess the impact of self funding.
Project funding dynamics exhibit early cascades of positive reinforcement known from previous
research [van de Rijt et al., 2014], however, such pledge boosts also happen relatively late during the
funding phase. Thus, project success is only partially path-dependent. Having a strong start is almost
universally leading to success, consistent with the findings of Colombo et al. [2015], but the converse is
not true: a slow start can still lead to success in a relevant percentage of cases. About 40% of projects
that lag behind by 30 or more percentage points with respect to the average project still manage to
reach the funding threshold, thanks to the attraction of large pledges in the last quarter of project life.
An econometric analysis that fully exploits our rich pledge-level dataset supports this key finding of
late stage herding.
Our analysis of funding dynamics shows that projects can get boosted to eventual success at vir-
tually any point of time. The crowdfunding literature has already identified communication to be a
key driver of success. Studies have focused on quality indicators of projects’ communication [Mollick,
2014], dialogue between fundraisers and pledgers [Beaulieu and Sarker, 2013, Kromidha and Robson,
2016, Wang et al., 2018], and project descriptions’ language [Herzenstein et al., 2011b, Frydrych et al.,
2016, Gafni et al., 2017]. Our paper goes a step further, showing that such communication efforts are
a key element driving the late surges. While our quantitative data do not allow us to connect the in-
crease in pledges to specific communication efforts, results from our qualitative analysis (interviews
with Startnext staff, questionnaire responses from severely under track projects) directly confirm this
conjecture [see Borst et al., 2017, for related evidence of social media usage (Twitter, facebook)]. It
seems that successful communication matters, irrespective of those efforts being made early or late in
a project’s life.
These results tie in with related findings by Stanko and Henard [2017] with respect to the rela-
tionship between crowdfunding and innovation. It seems that an engaging dialogue between project
and its community during the campaign can be beneficial in at least three dimensions. It tends to
improve the project’s chances to get funded in the first place, the quality of the future product (via
‘open search’) and the diffusion of the product (via activating ‘earliest adopters’). As crowdfunding
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is well-suited to encourage discourse (in comparison to traditional entrepreneurial financiers), it may
have a competitive edge beneficial for innovation. Moreover, the benefits of discourse with the crowd
appear to go beyond the current product/service as evidenced by research on serial crowdfunders
[Buttice` et al., 2017, Skirnevskiy et al., 2017].
Another interpretation of the observed late surges of severely under track projects points to self
funding. The disproportionally large pledges that tend to drive those boosts might originate from
project creators themselves. Since Startnext allows self pledges, we are able to directly identify them
and study their impact on project success and dynamics. This is unique in the crowdfunding literature
and in contrast to platforms like Kickstarter or Indiegogo who prohibit self pledges and sanction indi-
rect self funding attempts. Formal self pledge bans are easily circumvented [KickstarterForum, 2014,
Dresner, 2014], and it is hence likely that self funding takes place in the dark. Our analysis provides
a measure of the extent of self funding and assesses its impact on the funding process that would not
be possible in environments where self funding is not transparent. Furthermore, the patterns and dis-
tinctive characteristics of self pledges that we uncover could be helpful to detect self pledges at sites
that do not allow them.
We find that project creators self pledge strategically, with three main goals in mind: starting off a
campaign, trying to re-create interest in it after some inactivity, and secure funding by providing the
pivotal pledge that pushes the project over the threshold. Even if overall just 1.6% of pledges are self-
funded, a full third of project creators self pledges at least once, and one project in ten is either started
or pushed over the threshold by a self pledge. We find no compelling evidence of an indirect effect
of self pledges. In fact, self-started campaigns are significantly less likely to reach the funding target.
Presumably, project quality is a bigger determinant than the attempt to self-start funding. Moreover,
our results do not indicate that self pledges trigger subsequent herding behavior.
We further find no connection between self pledges and late surges at (severely) under track
projects. These are mostly driven by external funders who make large pledges, rather than insid-
ers tugging the project forward. Our results indicate that external individuals (‘angels in the crowd’)
can play an important part in the funding process, similar to what happens in the context of crowd-
investing.17
Overall, our analysis reveals that there are attempts of phishing. But is the crowd actually phooled
by the self funding [Akerlof and Shiller, 2015, Shiller, 2015]? We have established that self pledges
do not seem to have a positive impact on subsequent funding, yet persistent self funding (6% of all
projects self pledge more than a quarter of their campaign target) leads to eventual funding success.
It is not clear, though, whether these interventions necessarily bias funding decisions in a negative
way. Sometimes projects worthy of funding require information cascades to tap sufficient support
from the crowd [Parker, 2014]. Either way, the practice of self funding seems to contradict the concept
of ‘open innovation’ that is generally understood to be of high importance for the success of startups.
Giudici et al. [2018], for instance, stress the role of inbound open innovation – attracting innovative
funders that can contribute to project development – in the case of crowdfunding. In contrast to the
open exchange between creator and crowd, self funding appears to be a remnant of the previous,
closed approach to innovation. Self pledges, if discovered by the crowd and perceived as an attempt
17Vismara [2016] finds that early investors with public profiles play an influential role as they trigger information cascades.
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to manipulate the funding process, may also be detrimental to the relationship between creator and
crowd. Andre´ et al. [2017] argue that trust can be an important ingredient for the success of a campaign
as pledges are to a substantial extent based on reciprocal behavior. Self funding would undermine
such trust. An analysis of ultimate project success (does a project deliver on its promise or not?) of
self funded projects would be able to shed light on the longer-term consequences of self pledges. This
remains as a future avenue of research since our data do not allow us – beyond a simple analysis of
subsequent projects by the same project creator – to assess the actual delivery rate of projects.
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B. Questionnaire
Invitations to the survey have been sent out by email or pasted into a web contact form if no email
address was found.
Subject: Scientific study about your crowdfunding campaign campaign name at Startnext
Dear first name last name,
We would be happy if you could fill in our brief questionnaire (duration 10 minutes) that we con-
duct within our research project in cooperation with Startnext. In our project, funded by the German
Science Foundation, we already analyzed transactions of all Startnext projects before February 2014.
We have selected your project for a more detailed analysis. We are aware that quite some time has
passed since you ran the campaign. Even more so we would appreciate your support! As a reward
we will give you a e20 gift voucher. Your responses are confidential. They will be anonymized and
used exclusively for scientific purposes.
Our questions refer to your project campaign name, ran in month and year.
You can read the questions directly below (and answer them if you want) or start a survey via the
following link:
link
Questionnaire about your crowdfunding campaign at Startnext:
• Which presentation measures did you prepare before the start of the campaign (e.g., shooting a
video, setting up a blog, etc.)?
• Which communication measures did you prepare before the start of the campaign (e.g., send-
ing out a newsletter, Facebook, Twitter, other social media channels (please write them down),
contacting journalists, friends&acquaintances, etc.)?
• Which of these communication activities did you carry out at the start of the funding phase?
• How content were you with the progress of your campaign after the starting phase (circa 10%)?
• Did you carry out other communication activities after the starting phase? Did you shoot further
videos, did you update the blog, did you react to questions or comments?
• How content were you with the progress of your campaign after about 3/4 of the funding dura-
tion?
• Did you carry out other communication activities after about 3/4 of the funding duration?
• How content were you with the progress of your campaign during the last quarter of the funding
duration?
• In your opinion, what were the most important communication channels for the success of the
project?
• What would you do differently, if you had the chance to run the campaign again?
That’s it! Thank you very much for your support! You helped us a lot with our study. As a sign of
our gratitude we will send you a gift voucher of e20.
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C. Detailed questionnaire responses and selected plots
(a) Plot of project 1603, an eventual failure (b) Plot of project 330, an eventual success
Figure 5: Plots of two projects that have a relatively high target, start well and reach around 30% of
their target (at 75% of the campaign)
(a) Plot of project 2226, an eventual failure (b) Plot of project 2841, an eventual success
Figure 6: Plots of two projects that have a relatively high target and progress linearly to 25% of their
target (at 75% of the campaign). Red triangles represent self pledges.
(a) Plot of project 386, an eventual failure (b) Plot of project 2352, an eventual success
Figure 7: Plots of two projects that have a relatively small target and progress linearly to 30% or more
of their target (at 75% of the campaign). Red triangles represent self pledges.
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(a) Plot of project 2248, an eventual failure (b) Plot of project 1673, an eventual success
Figure 8: Plots of two projects that have a small to medium targets (not more than 10k) and progress
linearly to 25% or less of their target (at 75% of the campaign).
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